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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
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INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA
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USIAEA, USEEC

DEPT PASS IO/SCT AND S/AS
GENEVA FOR WARNEKE
DOE PASS AMMONS, IA

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, EEC, UR, US
SUBJECT: IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS: FEBRUARY BOARD
CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR

SUMMARY: SUBJECT CONSULTATIONS A.M. FEBRUARY 21
ADDRESSED STATUS EURATOM-IAEA NEGOTIATIONS OF FACILITY
ATTACHMENTS, OTHER ITEMS EXPECTED TO BE CONSIDERED BY
FEBRUARY BOARD, IAEA SECRETARIAT STAFFING AND SITE AND
PURPOSE OF FUTURE CONSULTATIONS RE IAEA MATTERS. END
SUMMARY.

1. AT ALMOST TWO-HOUR CONSULTATIONS AT USSR MISSION
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MORNING FEBRUARY 21, MOROKHOV WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ISAAEV,
AMB. EROFEEV AND SMOLIN, MISHARIN, ZABOV AND LEVSHIN OF
LOCAL MISSION. AMB. SMITH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ASST.
SECY. BERGOLD, BENGELSDORF, KIRK, NOSENZO, LABOWITZ AND
LEAHY.

2. MOROKHOV OPENED DISCUSSION WITH EXPOSE OF USSR

VIEWS OF STATUS OF EURATOM-IAEA FACILITY ATTACHMENT (FA) NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION IN WHICH EURATOM AND ITS MEMBER STATES CONCERNED WERE IN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENT WITH IAEA. MEMBER STATES, ESPECIALLY FRG DO NOT WANT TO ACCEPT STANDARD CONDITIONS PROPOSED BY IAEA AND EVEN REJECT SOME PROPOSALS WHICH FALL BELOW IAEA STANDARDS. HE RAISED QUESTION OF REASON FOR SUCH ATTITUDE WHICH HAS LED TO UNJUSTIFIED POSITION IN NEGOTIATION IN WHICH EURATOM TRYING TO DICTATE TERMS TO IAEA. HE ALLUDED TO PHONE MESSAGE FROM EURATOM TO IAEA FEBRUARY 16 RE LIGHT WATER REACTORS (LWRS) AND TO "BORIGHT COMPROMISE" REACHED IN DECEMBER (SIC) WHICH HAD BEEN REPLACED WITH NEW PROPOSALS. HE CONCLUDED WITH STATEMENT THAT IF BOTH U.S. AND USSR SUPPORT NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVE STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN BY BOTH TO RECTIFY SITUATION IN ORDER TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF NPT.

2. AMB. SMITH, BEFORE ADDRESSING SUBSTANCE OF MOROKHOV'S REMARKS, RAISED PROCEDURAL POINT RE SITE OF DISCUSSION OF MATTER RAISED BY LATTER. HE POINTED OUT THAT TALKS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN CAPITALS, VIENNA AND GENEVA AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD FACILITATE CONSULTATIONS IF DISCUSSIONS WERE CONFINED TO CAPITALS AND VIENNA.

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3. AMB. SMITH NOTED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN FACTS OF EURATOM-IAEA SITUATION. HE UNDERSTOOD EURATOM HAS ACCEPTED IAEA'S PROPOSAL (CLEARED BEFOREHAND WITH U.S. AND USSR) FOR INSPECTIONS OF LWRS. IT APPEARED TO U.S. THAT GOOD PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE SINCE SEPTEMBER, WITH RESULT THAT GOOD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT EXISTS RE 85 PERCENT OF PROBLEM. USG WAS SECOND TO NONE IN ITS INTEREST IN GOOD SAFEGUARDS AND WANTS TO AVOID BAD PRECEDENTS IN EURATOM-IAEA ARRANGEMENTS. WITH RESPECT TO SENSITIVE FACILITIES, USG REGARDS IT IMPORTANT TO AVOID RIGID FORMULATIONS FOR, E.G., REPROCESSING PLANTS, SINCE SAFEGUARDING TECHNIQUES ARE STILL BEING DEVELOPED AND ARE EVOLVING. THIS IS FACT OF LIFE MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE FACILITIES. EURATOM IS RELUCTANT TO AGREE ON FIXED DETECTION TIME UNTIL EFFECT IN TERMS OF INSPECTION ACTIVITIES IS KNOWN. EURATOM SAYS THAT INFORMATION HAS NOT YET BEEN GIVEN TO THEM, BUT ACTUAL FACTS RE THAT SITUATION IS DIFFICULT TO GET AT. IN SUM, USG IS PLEASED AT APPARENT PROGRESS IN LWR NEGOTIATIONS AND BELIEVES MORE TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR WORKING OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SENSITIVE FACILITIES.

4. MOROKHOV RESPONDED TO PROCEDURAL QUESTION OF LIMITING DISCUSSION TO VIENNA AND CAPITALS BY SAYING THAT WHEN HE RECEIVES ORDERS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT, HE MUST CARRY OUT WHEREVER HE IS AT TIME. HE HAD NOT RECEIVED REPLY TO HIS LAST APPROACH IN GENEVA AND HOPED TO RECEIVE IT AT THIS OCCASION. HE WOULD REPORT AMB. SMITH'S PROPOSAL.

5. RETURNING TO EURATOM-IAEA MATTER, MOROKHOV STATED THAT CAREFUL STUDY OF RELEVANT PAPERS REVEALED REGRESSION COMPARED TO "AGREEMENT" REACHED BY BORIGHT IN LUXEMBOURG.

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HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY BORIGHT THAT USG HAD BEEN SATISFIED WITH FREQUENCY AND CHARACTER OF INSPECTION AS "AGREED" AT THAT TIME. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS, WHICH HAVE SPECIAL CONCERN, TO DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN DETAIL. PROPOSAL TO "MAKE CONCESSIONS" RE LWRS AND LEAVE SENSITIVE FACILITIES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION WILL NOT WORK, AS INDICATED BY STUDY OF CURRENT PAPERS. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE ALL FACILITIES IN FRONT OF US, INCLUDING REPROCESSING PLANT, BEFORE TALKING OF "CONCESSIONS" FOR LWRS. USSR WAS NOT RPT NOT CONCERNED WITH SPECIFIC ISSUES RE LWRS, BUT WITH ATTITUDE OF EURATOM. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT AT TIME EURATOM-IAEA AGREEMENT WAS APPROVED, EURATOM HAD GOOD SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, BUT EXPERIENCE SHOWS SYSTEM

HAS NO MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY AND REPORTS SUBMITTED TO IAEA HAVE BEEN UNSATISFACTORY. JAPAN, ON OTHER HAND, HAD NO SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM ORIGINALLY BUT HAS MADE GOOD PROGRESS.

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6. AMB. SMITH CALLED UPON NOSENZO TO GIVE BACKGROUND OF EVENTS IN LUXEMBOURG AND ELSEWHERE LEADING TO PRESENT EURATOM-IAEA SITUATION. NOSENZO SAID THAT EVERYONE CONCERNED WAS IN PROCESS OF LEARNING HOW SENSITIVE FACILITIES COULD AND SHOULD BE SAFEGUARDED. ON OTHER HAND, CONCEPTS FOR SAFEGUARDING LWRS WERE BETTER UNDERSTOOD. ACCORDINGLY, DISCUSSIONS BY USG WITH EURATOM IN LUXEMBOURG ADDRESSED LWRS. EURATOM SAFEGUARDS ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN IN OPERATION FOR MANY YEARS AND HAS SOLID EXPERIENCE, INCLUDING ACCOUNTING SYSTEM AND REPORTS. USG OBJECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH EURATOM AND IAEA WAS TO MOVE TOWARD DESIRABLE GOALS OF ADEQUACY AND TIMELINESS OF DETECTION. THOSE GOALS WERE RECOGNIZED AS NOT NECESSARILY ACHIEVABLE OVERNIGHT AND IT WAS IN THAT CONTEXT THAT THEY WERE DISCUSSED WITH EURATOM AND IAEA, WITH RESPECT TO BOTH LWRS AND SENSITIVE FACILITIES. IN CASE OF LWRS, CONCEPT DISCUSSED WAS FOR INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS PENDING AVAILABILITY OF SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT WITH ASSURED RELIABILITY. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT PROPOSED BY IAEA RE SELECTION ON RANDOM BASIS OF 50 PERCENT OF THREE AND NINE MONTHLY INSPECTIONS HAD BEEN AGREED BY U.S. AND USSR IN VIENNA AND THAT IN PHONE CALL FROM WILLIAMS (FEBRUARY 16) EURATOM HAD ACCEPTED THAT PROPOSAL. INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS FOR SENSITIVE FACILITIES WERE STILL UNDER DISCUSSION AND EURATOM WANTS TO UNDERSTAND WHAT TIMELY DETECTION MEANS IN TERMS OF INSPECTIONS. U.S. BELIEVES THERE IS CREDIBLE RATIONALE FOR AWAITING TRANSLATION OF DETECTION TIME GOALS (WHICH ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE RIGID REQUIREMENTS) INTO INSPECTION CONSEQUENCES. THIS IS QUESTION OF PROCEDURE AND SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AS SUCH.

7. LABOWITZ POINTED OUT THAT, AT USG INSISTENCE, ALL
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NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING EURATOM AGREEMENT, CONTAINED PROVISION FOR IAEA TO CARRY OUT INSPECTIONS ON AD HOC BASIS NOTWITHSTANDING FAILURE TO COMPLETE FACILITY ATTACHMENTS AND USG HAD REMINDED IAEA OF ITS

RIGHT TO DO SO AND STATED OUR EXPECTATION THAT IAEA WOULD EXERCISE THAT RIGHT IN CASE OF EURATOM FACILITIES.

8. MISHARIN AGREED THAT IAEA HAD SUCH RIGHT, BUT THAT AD HOC INSPECTIONS WERE INADEQUATE SINCE NO SURVEILLANCE INSTRUMENTS COULD BE INSTALLED BEFORE COMPLETION OF FACILITY ATTACHMENT. WITHOUT SUCH EQUIPMENT, EFFECTIVENESS APPROACHES ZERO. HE REITERATED THAT SITUATION HAD REGRESSED AND GAVE AS EXAMPLE THAT LOOSCH OF FRG (PRESUMABLY AT CONSULTATION WITH USSR PREVIOUS EVENING) HAD SAID THAT "ANNUAL" INSPECTION OF LWRS PREVIOUSLY AGREED WOULD, UNDER CURRENT EURATOM COUNTER-PROPOSAL, BE RELATED TO REFUELING WHICH COULD OCCUR AT INTERVALS AS LONG AS 18 MONTHS. MOREOVER, SEMI-ANNUAL INSPECTION PREVIOUSLY AGREED WOULD, UNDER COUNTER-PROPOSAL BE ELIMINATED ENTIRELY ONCE SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT WAS AVAILABLE. THREE AND NINE-MONTHLY INSPECTIONS, ACCORDING TO EURATOM COUNTER-PROPOSAL ARE TO BE ONLY FOR CHECKING OF SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT AND TO BE DISCONTINUED COMPLETELY ONCE SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE, WHEREAS IT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN AGREED THAT, ONCE SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT WAS AVAILABLE, EURATOM INSPECTORS WOULD REMOVE TAMPER-PROOF CASSETTES FOR REVIEW BY IAEA. AS FURTHER EXAMPLE OF REGRESSION, HE CITED "BORIGHT COMPROMISE" RE THREE AND NINE-MONTHLY INTERIM INSPECTIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT BY IAEA ON RANDOM BASIS WHICH AMB. STONE, ON INSTRUCTIONS, PROPOSED TO PROVIDE 50 PERCENT "ASSURANCE" WHEREAS LOOSCH NOW CHARACTERIZES PROPOSAL AS "50 PERCENT OF INSPECTION

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EFFORT OF IAEA." MISHARIN OBJECTED TO INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS WHICH DEPEND UPON FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND HE DID NOT, IN ANY EVENT, REGARD SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT AS SUBSTITUTE FOR INSPECTIONS.

9. AMB. SMITH STATED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT U.S. AND USSR CANNOT REACH JOINT POSITION AND THAT THERE WAS OBVIOUS DISAGREEMENT ON FACTS. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT DIRGEN EKLUND WISHED TO MEET WITH HIM AND MOROKHOV AND HE WAS AVAILABLE TO DO SO. MOROKHOV CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS ALSO AVAILABLE AND THAT MEETING WAS SET FOR 11:30 THAT MORNING.

10. MOROKHOV STATED USSR WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH SITUATION RE LWRS AND WITH EURATOM'S TENDENCY TO AVOID IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND TO AVOID INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION BY IAEA. A POSITION HAD BEEN AGREED WITH USG SEVERAL MONTHS AGO TO PUT PRESSURE ON IAEA SECRETARIAT. U.S. WAS NOW TRYING TO PERSUADE USSR THAT CURRENT SITUATION WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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ALL RIGHT. HE PROPOSED THAT RESPECTIVE PERMANENT MISSIONS DISCUSS MATTER FURTHER QUIETLY AND WORK OUT APPROACH, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT NOT ONLY LWRS, BUT ALSO OTHER TYPES OF FACILITIES, INCLUDING SENSITIVE ONES, TO REACH COORDINATED APPROACH. HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO MAKE SHARP STATEMENT DISAGREEING WITH EURATOM APPROACH AND HAD SO INFORMED DIRGEN EKLUND AND FRG. COMMENT: FRG HAD EARLIER CONFIRMED THAT, AT CONCLUSION ONE-AND-HALF-HOUR CONSULTATION WITH MOROKHOV PREVIOUS EVENING, HE HAD REFERRED TO SUCH INSTRUCTIONS. END COMMENT.

11. AMB. SMITH REPLIED THAT USG WAS ALWAYS WILLING TO DISCUSS MATTER, PARTICULARLY SINCE THERE APPEARED TO BE INSUFFICIENT UNDERSTANDING OF OUR VIEWS. BUT DEVELOPMENT OF "COORDINATED POSITION" WAS NOT WHAT HE FORESAW AS RESULT. BOTH GOVERNMENTS MAY HAVE PARALLEL INTERESTS, BUT THERE WAS NOT RPT NOT COMMON POSITION VIS A VIS EURATOM. USG, IN ANY EVENT, ALWAYS WORKED CLOSELY WITH IAEA.

12. MOROKHOV RESPONDED THAT PERHAPS HE HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD; HE HAD NOT PROPOSED JOINT STATEMENT BUT RATHER COORDINATED APPROACH, AS PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY USG. IT WAS NOT NEW IDEA TO HAVE CONSULTATIONS FOR

COORDINATED APPROACH RE NON-PROLIFERATION. USSR NOT NECESSARILY INTERESTED IN JOINT STATEMENTS, BUT FORESAW INDEPENDENT BUT COORDINATED ACTIONS.

13. AMB. SMITH STATED THAT USG WELCOMES FULLEST POSSIBLE CONSULTATIONS. MOROKHOV SAID THAT WAS ALL HE HAD IN MIND.

14. AMB. SMITH MENTIONED THAT U.S. WOULD INTRODUCE
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RESOLUTION AT BOARD, CALLING FOR SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION REPORT (SSIR) TO BE ISSUED AS GENERAL CONFERENCE (UNRESTRICTED) INFORMATION DOCUMENT AND FUTURE SUCH ANNUAL REPORTS TO BE TREATED THE SAME, UNLESS BOARD DECIDES OTHERWISE. MOROKHOV SAID USSR HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH THAT PROPOSAL. HE ALSO SAW NO PROBLEM WITH ARGENTINA-PERU-U.S.-IAEA SUPPLY AGREEMENT.

15. MOROKHOV DID SEE PROBLEMS RE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH IAEA WOULD PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (TA) GENERALLY, SINCE PRESENT POLICY DID NOT REQUIRE SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH TA ON NUCLEAR REACTORS. MOREOVER, PREFERENCE SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR TA TO SUPPORTERS OF NON-PROLIFERATION. SAFEGUARDS SHOULD BE REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH TA FOR PROJECTS IN ALL SENSITIVE AREAS, INCLUDING ENRICHMENT, REPROCESSING, HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION, PLUTONIUM HANDLING AS WELL AS ALL ITEMS ON LONDON GROUP GUIDELINES (TRIGGER LIST). HE WOULD STATE THAT POSITION AT BOARD. (COMMENT: POLICY ON TA WAS SCHEDULED FOR INFORMAL MEETING SHORTLY AFTER BOARD RATHER THAN BOARD MEETING. END COMMENT.)

16. REMAINDER OF DISCUSSION WAS TAKEN UP BY USSR RESREP EORFEEV AND MOROKHOV WHO MADE DETERMINED PITCH FOR USSR CANDIDATE (PROF. FROLOV) TO SUCCEED SHALNOV (USSR) AS IAEA DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND LABORATORIES. EROFEEV REFERRED TO "PREVIOUS AGREEMENT" WITH AMB. STONE TO SUCH SUCCESSION AND EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT U.S. HAD NOMINATED CANDIDATE. AMB. SMITH STATED THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF SUCH PREVIOUS AGREEMENT AND POINTED OUT THAT ANOTHER DIRECTOR POST IN SAME DEPARTMENT WOULD BE OPEN AND THAT USSR FROLOV APPEARED QUALIFIED FOR THAT POSITION. MOROKHOV REFERRED TO "DISCUSSIONS" BY AMBS.

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STONE AND EROFEEV AND SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW
POSITION COULD BE FILLED ON BASIS OF PERSONAL INTERESTS
OF INDIVIDUAL (U.S. CANDIDATE). HE WOULD (OR HAD
ALREADY) CONSULTED DIRGEN AND DEP DIR GEN CONCERNED AND
EXPECTS FROLOV TO GET POSITION IN QUESTION. WHY DID
U.S. NOT FILL OTHER DIRECTOR POSITION? NO OBJECTIONS
HAD BEEN RAISED BY U.S. PREVIOUSLY TO USSR FILLING
POSITION IN QUESTION. HE SUGGESTED FURTHER CONTACTS ON
MATTER. AMB. SMITH SAID HE WOULD TELEPHONE AMB. STONE
AND IF HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN AGREEMENT,
U.S. WOULD HONOR IT. EORFEEV SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO
WRITTEN OR FORMAL AGREEMENT BUT THAT IN DISCUSSIONS OVER
COURSE OF ONE YEAR, NO OBJECTIONS HAD BEEN RAISED BY U.S.
ONLY RECENTLY HAD HE LEARNED OF U.S. CANDIDATE AND HE HAD
ASKED AMB. STONE FOR "CLARIFICATION" AND AMB. STONE
PROMISED TO LOOK INTO MATTER AND LET EROFEEV KNOW, BUT
AGAIN THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO USSR CANDIDATE.
EROFEEV CONTINUED, SAYING THAT JUST BEFORE AMB. STONE'S
DEPARTURE, HE HAD PHONED EROFEEV AND SAID HE WAS
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INSTRUCTED TO SUPPORT U.S. CANDIDATE. EROFEEV SAID HE
WOULD ASK DIRGEN WHEN HE HAD BECOME AWARE OF RESPECTIVE
U.S. AND USSR CANDIDATES.

17. MOROKHOV SAID HE WANTED "TRADITION" MAINTAINED THAT
WHEN NO OBJECTION WAS RAISED, IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT
CANDIDATE WOULD NOT BE OPPOSED, ALTHOUGH NO ONE IS

OBLIGATED TO SUPPORT CANDIDATE FROM OTHER STATE. USSR
HAD NOT OBJECTED WHEN POSTS FILLED BY U.S. NATIONALS
INCREASED FROM 60 TO 90 AND USSR HAD MADE NO CLAIMS TO
ANY POST FOR WHICH U.S. HAD PROPOSED CANDIDATES.
QUESTION UNDER DISCUSSION IS SIMPLE MATTER. HE WANTED
DIRGEN TO CONSULT GOVERNORS DURING FORTHCOMING MEETING
AND TO APPOINT DIRECTOR, IN ORDER TO AVOID INCON-
VENIENCE TO FROLOV WHO HAD ALREADY LEFT HIS INSTITUTE
IN EXPECTATION OF SUCH APPOINTMENT.

18. AMB. SMITH SAID MATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED FURTHER.
LABOWITZ

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETINGS, NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAMS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 24 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978VIENNA01800
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780086-0570
Format: TEL
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780213/aaaaakwz.tel
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Litigation History:
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Office: ACTION OES
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3477862
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS: FEBRUARY BOARD CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR SUMMARY: SUBJECT CONSULTATIONS A.M. FEBRUARY 21
TAGS: PARM, TECH, UR, US, IAEA, EEC
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbcc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/85a6b5cf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014